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Abstract. Bottleneck congestion games properly model the propertiesof many
real-world network routing applications. They are known topossess strong equi-
libria – a strengthening of Nash equilibrium to resilience against coalitional de-
viations. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of pure Nash and
strong equilibria in these games. We provide a generic centralized algorithm to
compute strong equilibria, which has polynomial running time for many interest-
ing classes of games such as, e.g., matroid or single-commodity bottleneck con-
gestion games. In addition, we examine the more demanding goal to reach equi-
libria in polynomial time using natural improvement dynamics. Using unilateral
improvement dynamics in matroid games pure Nash equilibriacan be reached
efficiently. In contrast, computing even a single coalitional improvement move
in matroid and single-commodity games is stronglyNP-hard. In addition, we es-
tablish a variety of hardness results and lower bounds regarding the duration of
unilateral and coalitional improvement dynamics. They continue to hold even for
convergence to approximate equilibria.
1 Introduction
One of the central challenges in algorithmic game theory is to characterize the
computational complexity of equilibria. Results in this direction yield important
indicators if game-theoretic solution concepts are plausible outcomes of com-
petitive environments in practice. Probably the most prominent stability concept
in (non-cooperative) game theory is the Nash equilibrium – astate, from which
no player wants to unilaterally deviate. The complexity of Nash equilibrium has
been under increased scrutiny for quite some time. A drawback of the Nash equi-
librium is that in general it exists only in mixed strategies. There are, however,
practically important classes of games that allow pure Nashequilibria (PNE),
most prominently congestion games. In a congestion game [19], there is a set
of resources, and the pure strategies of players are subsetsof thi set. Each re-
source has a delay function depending on theload, i.e., the number of players
that select strategies containing the respective resource. The individual cost for
a player in a regular congestion game is given by thesumover the delays of the
resources in his strategy.
Congestion games are an elegant model to study the effects of resource us-
age and congestion with strategic agents. They have been used frequently to
model competitive network routing scenarios [20]. For these games the com-
plexity of exact and approximate PNE is now well-understood. A etailed char-
acterization in terms of, e.g., the structure of strategy spaces [1, 8] or the delay
functions [4, 22] has been derived. However, regular congestion games have
shortcomings, especially as models for the prominent application of routing in
computer networks. The delay of a stream of packets is usually determined by
the latency experienced due to available bandwidth or capacity of links. Hence,
the total delay of a player is closely related to the performance of the most con-
gested (bottleneck) link (see, e.g., [3,5,13,18]). A modelthat captures this aspect
more realistically arebottleneck congestion games, in which the individual cost
of a player is the maximum (instead of sum) of the delays in hisstrategy. De-
spite being a more realistic model for network routing, theyave not received
similar attention in the literature. For classes of non-atomic (with infinitesimally
small players) and atomic splittable games (finite number ofplayers with arbi-
trarily splittable demand) existence of PNE and bounds on the price of anarchy
were considered in [5,16]. For atomic games with unsplittable demand PNE do
always exist [3]. In fact, Harks et al. [11] establish the finite improvement prop-
erty via a lexicographic potential function. Interestingly, they are able to extend
these conditions to hold even ifcoalitionsof players are allowed to change their
strategy in a coordinated way. This implies that bottleneckcongestion games
do admit even (pure)strong equilibria (SE), a solution concept introduced by
Aumann [2]. In a SE, no coalition (of any size) can deviate andstrictly decrease
the individual cost of each member. Every SE is a PNE, but the converse holds
only in special cases (e.g., for singleton games [12]).
SE represent a very robust and appealing stability concept.In general games,
however, they are quite rare, which makes the existence guarantee in bottleneck
congestion games even more remarkable. For instance, even in dominant strat-
egy games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma there might be no SE.Not surpris-
ingly, for regular congestion games with linear aggregation he existence of SE
is not guaranteed [12, 14]. The existence of PNE and SE in bottleneck conges-
tion games raises a variety of important questions regarding their computational
complexity. In which cases can PNE and SE be computed efficiently? As the
games have the finite improvement property, another important issue is the du-
ration of natural (coalitional) improvement dynamics. More fundamentally, it is
not obvious that even a single such coalitional improving move can be found
efficiently. These are the main questions that we address in thispaper.
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1.1 Our Results
We examine the computational complexity of PNE and SE in bottleneck con-
gestion games. In Section 2 we focus on computing PNE and SE using (cen-
tralized) algorithms. Our first main result is a generic algorithm that computes
a SE for any bottleneck congestion game. The algorithm iterat v ly decreases
capacities on the resources and relies on astr tegy packing oracle. The ora-
cle decides if a given set of capacities allows to pack a colletion of feasible
strategies for all players and outputs a feasible packing ifone exists. The run-
ning time of the algorithm is essentially determined by the running time of
this oracle. We show that there are polynomial time oracles for three impor-
tant and fundamental combinatorial structures: matroids,a-arborescences, and
single-commodity networks. Matroids contain among othersspanning trees in
undirected graphs which have applications in several areas. Regarding directed
graphs,a-arborescences arise as a natural generalization of spanning trees. Our
generic algorithm yields anefficient algorithm to compute SE for the corre-
sponding classes of games. For general games, however, we sho that the prob-
lem of computing a SE isNP-hard, even in two-commodity networks.
In Section 3 we study the duration and complexity of sequential improve-
ment dynamics that converge to PNE and SE. We first observe that for every
matroid bottleneck congestion game the lazy best response dynamics presented
in [1] converge in polynomial time to a PNE. In contrast to this positive result
for unilateral dynamics, we show that it isNP-hard to decide if a coalitional im-
proving move exists, even for matroid and single-commoditynetwork games,
and even if the deviating coalition is fixed a priori. This higl hts an interesting
contrast for these two classes of games: While there are polynomial time algo-
rithms to compute a SE, it is impossible to decide efficiently if a given state is a
SE – the decision problem isco-NP-hard.
For more general games, we observe in Section 3.2 that constructions of [22]
regarding the hardness of computing PNE in regular games canbe adjusted to
yield similar results for bottleneck games. In particular,in (a) symmetric games
with arbitrary delay functions and (b) asymmetric games with bounded-jump
delay functions computing a PNE isPLS-complete. In addition, we show that
in both cases there exist games and starting states, from which every sequence
of improvement moves to a PNE is exponentially long. We extend this result to
the case when moves of coalitions of sizeO(n1−ǫ ) are allowed, for any constant
ǫ > 0. In addition, we observe that all of these hardness resultsgeneralize to
the computation ofα-approximate PNE and SE, for any polynomially bounded
factorα. An α-approximate PNE (SE) is a relaxation of a PNE (SE), which is
stable only against (coalitional) improving moves that decrease the delay of the
(every) moving player by at least a factor ofα > 1.
3
We conclude the paper in Section 4 by outlining some interesting open prob-
lems regarding the convergence to approximate equilibria.All proofs missing in
this extended abstract are presented in the Appendix.
1.2 Preliminaries
Bottleneck congestion gamesare strategic gamesG = (N,S, (ci)i∈N), where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the non-empty and finite set of players,S = ×i∈N Si is the
non-empty set ofstatesor strategy profiles, andci : S → N is theindividual cost
function that specifies the cost value of playeri for each stateS ∈ S. A game
is called finite ifS is finite. For the sake of a clean mathematical definition, we
define strategies and costs using the general notion of a congestion model. A
tupleM = (N,R,S, (dr )r∈R) is called acongestion modelif N = {1, . . . , n} is a
non-empty, finite set of players,R = {1, . . . ,m} is a non-empty, finite set ofre-
sources, andS =×i∈N Si is the set of states or profiles. For each playeri ∈ N,
the setSi is a non-empty, finite set ofpure strategies Si ⊆ R. Given a stateS,
we defineℓr(S) = |{i ∈ N : r ∈ Si}| as the number of players usingr in S. Every
resourcer ∈ R has adelay function dr : S → N defined asdr (S) = dr (ℓr (S)).
In this paper, all delay functions are non-negative and non-decreasing. A con-
gestion modelM is calledmatroid congestion modelif for every i ∈ N there
is a matroidMi = (R,Ii) such thatSi equals the set of bases ofMi. We denote
by rk(M) = maxi∈N rk(Mi) the rank of the matroid congestion model. (Bottle-
neck) congestion games corresponding to matroid congestion m dels will be
calledmatroid (bottleneck) congestion games. Matroids exhibit numerous nice
properties, some of which are described in the Appendix. Fora comprehensive
overview see standard textbooks [15, Chapter 13] and [21, Chapters 39 – 42].
Let M be a congestion model. The correspondingbottleneck congestion
gameis the strategic gameG(M) = (N,S, (ci)i∈N) in which ci is given by




. We dropM whenever it is clear from context. We
define the correspondingregular congestion gamein the same way, the only
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∈ S × S is called anα-improving moveof coalition C if




improving move(or profitable deviation). A stateS is a k-strong equilibrium
(k-SE), if there is no improving move (S, ·) for a coalition of size at mostk.
We sayS is a strong equilibrium (SE) if and only if it is an-SE. Similarly,S
is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if and only if it is a 1-SE. We call a stateS
anα-approximate SE (PNE) if no coalition (single player) has anα-improving
move (S, ·). We denote byI (S) the set of all possibleα-improving moves (S,S′)
to other statesS′ ∈ S. We call a sequence of states (S0,S1, . . . ) animprovement
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path if every tuple (Sk,Sk+1) ∈ I (Sk) for all k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Intuitively, an
improvement path is a path in a so-calledstate graphG(G) derived fromG,
where every stateS ∈ S corresponds to a node inG(G) and there is a directed
edge (S,S′) if and only if (S,S′) ∈ I (S).
2 Computing Strong Equilibria
In this section, we investigate the complexity of computinga SE in bottleneck
congestion games. We first present a generic algorithm that computes a SE for
an arbitrary bottleneck congestion game. It uses an oracle that solves a strat-
egy packing problem (see Definition 1), which we termstrategy packing oracle.
For games in which the strategy packing oracle can be implemented in polyno-
mial time, we obtain a polynomial algorithm computing a SE. We then examine
games for which this is the case. In general, however, we prove that computing
a SE isNP-hard, even for two-commodity bottleneck congestion games.
The Dual Greedy. The general approach of our algorithm is to introduce upper
boundsur (capacities) on each resourcer. The idea is to iteratively reduce upper
bounds of costly resources as long as the residual capacities admit a feasible
strategy packing, see Definition 1 below. Our algorithm can be interpreted as
a dual greedy, orworst out algorithmas studied, e.g., in the field of network
optimization, see Schrijver [21].
Definition 1. [Strategy packing oracle]
I: Finite set of resources R with upper bounds(ur )r∈R, and n collections
S1, . . . ,Sn ⊆ 2R given implicitly by a certain combinatorial property.
O: Sets S1 ∈ S1, . . . ,Sn ∈ Sn such that|i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : r ∈ Si | ≤ ur for all
r ∈ R, or the information, that no such sets exist.
More specifically, when the algorithm starts, no strategy has been assigned
to any player and each resource can be used byn players, thus,ur = n. If r is
used byn players, its cost equalsdr (n). The algorithm now iteratively reduces
the maximum resource cost by picking a resourcer′ with maximum delaydr (ur )
and ur > 0. The number of players allowed onr′ is reduced by one and the
strategy packing oracle checks, if there is a feasible strategy profile obeying
the capacity constraints. If the strategy packing oracle outputs such a feasible
stateS, the algorithm reiterates by choosing a (possibly different) resource that
has currently maximum delay. If the strategy packing oraclereturns∅ after the
capacity of somer′ ∈ R was reduced tour ′ − 1, we fix the strategies of those
ur ′ many players that usedr′ in the state the strategy packing oracle computed
in the previous iteration and decrease the boundsur of all resources used in the
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strategies accordingly. This ensures thatr′ is frozen, i.e., there is no residual
capacity onr′ for allocating this resource in future iterations of the algorithm.
The algorithm terminates after at mostn · m calls of the oracle. For a formal
description of the algorithm see Algorithm 1 in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Dual Greedy computes a SE.
It is worth noting that the dual greedy algorithm applies to arbitrary strategy
spaces. If the strategy packing problem can be solved in polynomial time, this
algorithm computes a SE in polynomial time. Hence, the problem of computing
a SE is polynomial time reducible to the strategy packing problem. For general
bottleneck congestion games the converse is also true.
Theorem 2. The strategy packing problem is polynomial time reducible to the
problem of computing a SE in a bottleneck congestion game.
Note that in the proof of the upper theorem the combinatorialstructure of
the strategy packing problem is not preserved. However, it is easy to establish a
one to one correspondence for the casen = 2. That is, a SE of the two player
gameG = (N,S1 × S2, (ci)i∈N) can be computed in polynomial time for all
delay functions if and only if the strategy packing oracle with inputS1,S2 can
be implemented in polynomial time for every vector of capacities.
In the next section we will present some interesting cases, in wh ch the strat-
egy packing problem can be solved in polynomial time, or in which computation
becomesNP-hard.
Complexity of Strategy Packing
Theorem 3. The strategy packing problem can be solved in polynomial time for
matroid bottleneck congestion games where the strategy setof player i equals
the set of bases of a matroid Mi = (R,Ii) given by a polynomial independence
oracle.
Proof. For each matroidMi = (R,Ii), we construct a matroidM′i = (R
′,I′i ) as
follows. For each resourcer ∈ R, we introduceur resourcesr1, . . . , rur to R′. We
say thatr is therepresentativeof r1, . . . , rur . Then, a setI ′ ⊂ R′ is independent in
M′i if the setI that arises fromI
′ by replacing resources by their representatives
is independent inMi. This construction gives rise to a polynomial independence
oracle forM′i .
Now, we regard the matroid unionM′ = M′1 ∨ · · · ∨ M
′
n, see Definition 2
in the Appendix, which again is a matroid. Using the algorithm proposed by




polynomial inn, m, rk(M), and the maximum complexity of then independence
oracles.
Clearly, if |B| <
∑
i∈N rk(Mi), there is no feasible packing of the bases of
M1, . . . ,Mn. If, in contrast, |B| =
∑
i∈N rk(Mi), we obtain the corresponding
strategies (S1, . . . ,Sn) using the algorithm. ⊓⊔
We now consider strategy spaces defined asa- rborescences, which are in gen-
eral not matroids. LetD = (V,R) be a directed graph with|R| = m. For a distin-
guished node ina ∈ V, we define ana-arborescenceas a directed spanning tree,
wherea has in-degree zero and every other vertex has in-degree one.
Theorem 4. The strategy packing problem can be solved in timeO(m2 n2) for
a-arborescence games in which the set of strategies of each pl yer equals the
set of a-arborescences in a directed graphD = (V,R).
For single-commodity networks efficient computation of a SE is possible
using well-known flow algorithms to implement the oracle. When we generalize
to two commodities, however, a variety of problems concerning SE becomeNP-
hard by a simple construction.
Theorem 5. The strategy packing problem can be solved in timeO(m3) for
single-commodity bottleneck congestion games.
Proof. Assigning a capacity ofur to each edge and using the algorithm of Ed-
monds and Karp we obtain a maximum flow withinO(m3). Clearly, if the value
of the flow is smaller than, no admissible strategies exist and we can return∅.
If the flow is n or larger we can decompose it in at leastn unit flows and return
n of them. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. In two-commodity network bottleneck games it is stronglyNP-
hard to (1) compute a SE, (2) decide for a given state whether any coalition
has an improving move, and (3) decide for a given state and a given coalition if
it has an improving move.
Proof. We reduce from the 2 D A-D P (2DADP) problem,
which is stronglyNP-hard, see Fortune et al. [9]. The problem is to decide if
for a given directed graphD = (V,A) and two node pairs (s1, t1), (s2, t2) there
exist two arc-disjoint (s1, t1)- and (s2, t2)-paths. For the reduction, we define a
corresponding two-commodity bottleneck game by introducing non-decreasing
delay functions on every arcr by dr (x) = 0, if x ≤ 1 and 1, else. We associate
every commodity with a player. Then, 2DADP is a Yes-instanceif and only if
every SE provides a payoff of zero to every player.
For the other problems we simply construct a solution, in which the strate-
gies are not arc-disjoint. The remaining results follow. ⊓⊔
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3 Convergence of Improvement Dynamics
In the previous section, we have outlined some prominent classes of games, for
which SE can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, itis known [11]
that sequential improvement dynamics converge to PNE and SE. We now show
that the Nash dynamics convergences quickly to a PNE in matroid games. For
the convergence to SE one has to consider deviations of coalitions of players.
However, deciding if such a deviation exists isNP-hard even in matroid games
or single-commodity network games.
3.1 Matroid and Single-Commodity Network Games
We first observe that bottleneck congestion games can be transfo med into reg-
ular congestion games while preserving useful properties regarding the conver-
gence to PNE. This allows to show fast convergence to PNE in matroid bottle-
neck games.
Convergence to Pure Nash Equilibria. The following lemma establishes a
connection between bottleneck and regular congestion games. For a bottleneck
congestion gameG we denote byGsum the regular congestion game with the
same congestion model asG except that we choosed′r (·) = m
dr (·), r ∈ R.
Lemma 1. Every PNE for Gsum is a PNE for G.
Proof. SupposeS is a PNE forGsum but not forG. Thus, there is playeri ∈ N
and strategyS′i ∈ Si, such that maxr∈Si dr (ℓr(S)) > maxr∈S′i dr (ℓr(S
′
i ,S−i)). We
defined̄ := maxr∈S′i dr (ℓr (S
′
i ,S−i)). This implies maxr∈Si dr (ℓr (S)) ≥ d̄ + 1.We
obtain a contradiction by observing
∑
r∈Si
d′r (ℓr(S)) ≥ max
r∈Si
d′r (ℓr (S)) ≥ m







We analyze the lazy best response dynamics considered for regula matroid
congestion games presented in [1] and combine their analysis with Lemma 1.
This allows to establish the following result.
Theorem 7. Let G be a matroid bottleneck congestion game. Then the lazy best
response dynamics converges to a PNE in at most n2 ·m · rk(M) steps.
Proof. We consider the lazy best response dynamics in the corresponding game
Gsum. In addition, we suppose that a player accepts a deviation only if his bottle-
neck value is strictly reduced. It follows that the durations still bounded from
above byn2 ·m · rk(M) best responses as shown in [1]. ⊓⊔
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Convergence to Strong Equilibria. For matroid bottleneck congestion games
we have shown above that it is possible to converge to a PNE in polynomial
time by a kind of best-response dynamics with unilateral improving moves.
While previous work [11] establishes convergence to SE for every sequence
of coalitional improving moves, it may already be hard to findone such move.
In fact, we show that anα-improving move can be stronglyNP-hard to find,
even if strategy spaces have simple matroid structures. Thiimplies that decid-
ing whether a given state is anα-approximate SE is stronglyco-NP-hard – even
if all delay functions satisfy theβ-bounded-jump condition3 for anyβ > α.
Theorem 8. In matroid bottleneck congestion games it is stronglyNP-hard to
decide for a given state S if there is some coalition C⊆ N that has anα-
improving move, for every polynomial time computableα.
Proof. We reduce from S P. An instance of S P is given by
a set of elementsE and a setU of setsU ⊆ E, and a numberk. The goal is
to decide if there arek mutually disjoint sets inU. Given an instance of S
P we show how to construct a matroid gameG and a stateS such that
there is an improving move for some coalition of playersC if and only if the
instance of S P has a solution.
The game will include|N| = 1+ |U|+ |E|+
∑
U∈U |U |many players. First, we
introduce a master playerp1, which has two possible strategies. He can either
pick thecoordination resource rc or thetrigger resource rt. For each setU ∈ U,
there is aset player pU . PlayerpU can choose eitherrt or a set resource rU .
For each setU and each elemente∈ U, there is aninclusion player pU,e. Player
pU,e can use either the set resourceU or anelement resource re. Finally, for each
elemente, there is anelement player pe that has strategies{rc, re} and{rc, ra} for
some absorbing resourcera.
The stateS is given as follows. Playerp1 is on rc, all set players usert, all
inclusion players the corresponding set resourcesU , and all element players
the strategies{rc, re}. The coordination resourcerc is a bottleneck for the master
player and all element players. The delays aredrc(x) = α + 1, if x > |E| and 1,
otherwise. The trigger resource has delaydrt (x) = 1, if x ≤ |U|−k+1, andα+1,
otherwise. For the set resourcesrU the delay isdrU (x) = 1, if x ≤ 1 andα + 1,
otherwise. Finally, for the element resources the delay isdre(x) = 1 if x ≤ 1 and
α + 1 otherwise. For the remaining arguments see the Appendix. ⊓⊔
The previous theorem shows hardness of the problem of findinga suitable
coalition and a corresponding improving move. Even if we specify the coalition
3 Delay functiondr satisfies theβ-bounded-jump condition ifdr (x+ 1) ≤ β ·dr (x) for anyx ≥ 1.
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in advance and search only for strategies corresponding to an improving move,
the problem remains stronglyNP-hard.
Corollary 1. In matroid bottleneck congestion games it is stronglyNP-hard to
decide for a given state S and a given coalition C⊆ N if there is anα-improving
move for C, for every polynomial time computableα.
We can adjust the previous two hardness results on matroid games to hold
also for single-commodity network games.
Theorem 9. In single-commodity network bottleneck congestion games it is
strongly NP-hard to decide for a given state S (1) if there is some coalitin
C ⊆ N that has anα-improving move, and (2) if a given coalition C⊆ N has an
α-improving move, for every polynomial time computableα.
3.2 General Games and Approximation
The results of the previous sections imply hardness of the computation of SE
or coalitional deviations, even in network games. Therefore, when considering
general games we here restrict ourselves mostly to unilateral improving moves
and PNE. Unfortunately, even in this restricted case the hardness results for reg-
ular congestion games in Skopalik and Vöcking [22] immediately imply iden-
tical results for bottleneck congestion games. The main result of [22] shows
that computing an approximate PNE isPLS-hard. The proof is a reduction from
CF. We can regard the resulting congestion game as a bottleneckcon-
gestion game. It is straightforward to adjust all argumentsin he proof of [22] to
remain valid for bottleneck congestion games. We provide some details on the
construction in the Appendix. A standard transformation [8] immediately yields
the same result even for symmetric games, in whichSi = S j for all i, j ∈ N.
Corollary 2. Finding anα-approximate PNE in a symmetric bottleneck con-
gestion game with positive and increasing delay functions is PLS-complete, for
every polynomial-time computableα > 1.
A second result in [22] reveals that sequences ofα-improving moves do not
reach anα-approximate PNE quickly – even if all delay functions satisfy the
β-bounded-jump condition with a constantβ. Again, the proof remains valid if
one regards the game as an asymmetric bottleneck congestiongame. This yields
the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For everyα > 2, there is aβ > 1 such that, for every n∈ N, there
is a bottleneck congestion game G(n) and a state S with the following prop-
erties. The description length of G(n) is polynomial in n. The length of every
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sequence ofα-improving moves leading from S to anα-approximate equilib-
rium is exponential in n. All delay functions of G(n) satisfy theβ-bounded-jump
condition.
Using the same trick as before to convert an asymmetric game in a symmetric
one yields a similar result for symmetric games. However, wemust sacrifice the
β-bounded-jump condition of the delay functions, for everyβ polynomial inn.
Despite the fact that (coalitional) improving moves areNP-hard to compute,
one might hope that the state graph becomes sufficiently dense such that it al-
lows short improvement paths. Unfortunately, we can show that this is not true,
even if we consider all improving moves of coalitions of sizeup toO(n1−ǫ ), for
any constantǫ > 0. Again, the same result holds for symmetric games when
sacrificing the bounded-jump condition.
Theorem 10. For everyα > 2, there is aβ > 1 such that, for every n∈ N
and for every k∈ N, there is a bottleneck congestion game G(n, k) and a state
S with the following properties. The description length of G(n, k) is polynomial
in n and k. The length of every sequence ofα-improving moves of coalitions of
size at most k leading from S′ to anα-approximate k-SE is exponential in n. All
delay functions of G(n, k) satisfy theβ-bounded-jump condition.
4 Conclusion
We have provided a detailed study of the computational complexity of exact and
approximate pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games.
However, some important and fascinating open problems remain. While we have
shown that results from [22] essentially translate, we werenot able to estab-
lish the positive result of [4] about quick convergence to approximate PNE for
symmetric games with bounded-jump delays. In addition, there are open prob-
lems regarding the duration of unilateral dynamics in symmetric network games
and hardness of computing PNE in asymmetric networks. Finally, it would be
interesting to see how results on centralized computation of SE extend to the
computation ofα-approximate SE andk-SE, for 1< k < n.
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Appendix
Basics in Matroid Theory
In the following, we will briefly introduce the notion of matroids. For a compre-
hensive introduction as well as for the proofs of the mentioned results we refer
the reader to the textbooks of Korte and Vygen [15, Chapter 13] and Schri-
jver [21, Chapters 39 – 42].
Let R be a finite set. A tupleM = (R,I) whereI ⊂ 2R is called amatroid
if ( i) ∅ ∈ I, (ii ) if I ∈ I and J ⊆ I , then J ∈ I, and (iii ) if I , J ∈ I and
|J| < |I |, then there exists ani ∈ I \ J with J ∪ {i} ∈ I. A set A ⊆ R is called
independentif A ∈ I and dependent, otherwise. The set of (inclusion wise)
maximal independent subsets ofR is called thebasisof M.
For givenR, a matroid (R,I) may be of exponential size, thus, one fre-
quently assumes that a matroid comes with anindependence oraclethat returns
for all setsA ⊆ R whetherA ∈ I or not. It shall be noted that for many sub-
classes of matroids an independence oracle can be implementd in polynomial
time.
Another way of representing matroids is via arank functionrk : 2R →
N. Every sub-cardinal, monotonic and sub-modular function4 rk gives rise to
a matroid whose independent sets then are defined as{A ⊆ R : rk(A) = |A|}.
If the independent sets are known a priori via an independence oracle the rank
function is defined as rk(A) = maxI∈I:I⊆A |I |. With a slight abuse of notation, we
define for a matroidM = (R,I) the rank of the matroid itself as rk(M) = rk(R).
To present our positive results for matroid bottleneck congestion games in
a general framework we give the definition of matroid union. This concept has
been introduced by Nash-Williams [17] and Edmonds [7].
Definition 2 (Matroid union). Let M1 = (S1,I1), . . . ,Mk = (Sk,Ik) be ma-
troids. Define the union of these matroids as M1∨· · ·∨Mk = (S1∪· · ·∪Sk,I1∨
· · · ∨ Ik) where
I1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ik = {I1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ik : I1 ∈ I1, . . . , Ik ∈ Ik}.
Nash-Williams proved that fork matroidsM1 = (S1,I1), . . . ,Mk = (Sk,Ik)
their unionM1 ∨ · · · ∨ Mk is a matroid again. The maximum cardinality of an
independent set inI1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ik equals the maximum cardinality of a common
independent set of two suitably constructed matroids. Thisobservation reduces
the problem of finding a maximum-size set inI1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ik to the intersection
problem of two matroids, which can be solved in polynomial time, see Cunning-
ham [6].
4 A function f : 2R → N is calledsub-cardinalif f (A) ≤ |A| for all A ⊆ R andsub-modularif
f (A) + f (B) ≥ f (A∪ B) + f (A∩ B) for all A, B ⊆ R.
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The Generic Algorithm for SE Computation
Algorithm 1 : Dual Greedy, the strategy packing oracle is denoted byO.
Input : Bottleneck congestion gameG(M) to the modelM = (N,R,S, (d)r∈R)
Output : SE ofG
setN′ = N, and ur = n, lr = 0, for all r ∈ R and S′ = O(N′,R,SN′ ,ur ) ;1
while {r ∈ R : ur > 0} , ∅ do2
chooser ′ ∈ arg maxr∈R:ur>0{dr(ur + lr)} ;3
ur′ := ur′ − 1 ;4
if O(N′,R,SN′ ,ur ) = ∅ then5
ur′ := ur′ + 1 ;6
foreach j ∈ N′ with r ′ ∈ S′j do7
S j := S′j ;8
set lr := lr + 1, ur := ur − 1 for all r ∈ S′j ;9
N′ := N′ \ { j} ;10
end11
end12




Proof of Theorem 1 Let S denote the output of the algorithm. In addition, we
denote byNk, k = 1 . . . ,K, the sets of players whose strategies are determined
after the strategy packing oracle (denoted byO) returned∅ for thek-th time. We
denote the pivotal resource for whichO returns∅ for thek-th time byrk.
Clearly,ci(S) ≤ c j(S) for all i ∈ Nk, j ∈ Nl , with k ≥ l. We will show by
complete induction overk that the players inN1∪· · ·∪Nk will not participate in
any improving move of any coalition. We start with the casek = 1. Let (ur )r∈R
be the vector of capacities in the algorithm after the strategy packing oracle
returned∅ for the first time andur1 is updated. Suppose there is a coalition
C1 ⊆ N with C1 ∩ N1 , ∅ that deviates profitably from strategy profileS to
strategy profileT = (S′C1,S−C1). We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: ℓr (T) ≤ ur for all r ∈ R. SinceO(N,R,S, ũ) = ∅, where ũr =
ur−1, if r = r1 andur , else, at least|N1| players user1 in T. Usingdr1(T) ≥ dr (S)
for all r ∈ R, we obtain a contradiction to the fact that every member ofC1 must
strictly improve.
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Case 2: There is ˜r ∈ R such thatℓr̃ (T) > ur . Using that Dual Greedy itera-
tively reduces the capacity of those resources with maximumdelay (line 3), we
derive thatdr̃ (ℓr̃(T)) ≥ dr (ℓr(S)) for all r ∈ R. Usingℓr̃(T) > ur , there is at least
one playeri ∈ C1 with r̃ ∈ Ti , hence, this player does not strictly improve.
For the induction stepk → k + 1, suppose the players inN1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nk
stick to their strategies and consider the players inNk+1. With a slight abuse
of notation we again denote by (ur )r∈R the vector of capacities in the algorithm
after the strategy packing oracle returned∅ for the (k + 1)-st time andurk+1
is updated. Recall that in the (k + 1)-st iteration of the algorithm the equality
N′ = Nk+1 ∪ · · · ∪ NK holds. Now, suppose that there is a coalitionCk+1 with
Ck+1∩Nk+1 , ∅ that deviates profitably from strategy profileS to strategy profile
T = (S′Ck+1,S−Ck+1). Using the induction hypothesis we know thatCk+1∩Ni = ∅
for all i ≤ k. We again distinguish the following two cases.
Case 1:ℓr(T) ≤ lr + ur for all resourcesr ∈ R. Note thatO(N′,R,SN′ , ũ) =
∅, whereũr = ur − 1 if r = rk+1 and ũr = ur , else. Using that no player in
N1∪ · · · ∪Nk takes part in the deviation fromS to T and thatT satisfiesℓr(T) ≤
lr + ur we derive thatℓrk+1(T) ≥ lrk+1 + urk+1. This implies by construction that
drk+1(ℓrk+1(T)) ≥ dr (ℓr(S)) for all resourcesr ∈ R and we obtain a contradiction
to the fact that every member of the coalitionCk+1 strictly improves.
Case 2:There is a resource ˜r ∈ R such thatℓr̃ (T) > lr + ur . Again using
the induction hypothesis and the fact that Dual Greedy iterat vely reduces the
capacity of the resources with maximum delaydr (lr +ur ), we obtaindr̃ (ℓr̃ (T)) ≥
dr (ℓr (S)) for all r ∈ R. Hence, there is at least one player of the deviating coali-
tion moving to resource ˜r and does not improve. Thus, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2 Given an instance of the strategy packing problemΠ we
construct a bottleneck congestion gameGΠ . LetΠ be given as set of resources
R with upper bounds (ur )r∈R, andn collectionsS1, . . . ,Sn ⊆ 2R. The gameGΠ
consists of the resourcesR∪ {r1, . . . , rn} and the players 1, . . . , n+ 1. The set of
strategies of playeri ∈ {1, . . . , n} is {Si ∪ {r i} | Si ∈ Si}. Playern + 1 has the
strategiesR and{r1, . . . , rn}. For each resourcer ∈ R the delay is 0 it is used by
at mostur + 1 and 2 otherwise. For each resource∈ {r1, . . . , rn} the delay is 0,
if used by at most one player and 1, otherwise.
If a strategy profile of the player 1, . . . , n violates an upper boundur on a
resourcer ∈ R, playern + 1 has delay of 2 if he plays strategyR. If he plays
{r1, . . . , rn} he and all other players have delay of 1. Hence, if there is a feasible
strategy packing, every SE of the game yields delay 0 for every player. Other-
wise, every SE yields delay 1 for every player. Therefore, thstate of the players
1, . . . , n in a SE ofGΠ corresponds to a solution for the strategy packing prob-
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lemΠ , if such a solution exists. On the other hand, if there is no solution forΠ ,
every player in every SE inGΠ has delay of 1.
Proof of Theorem 4 The problem of findingk disjoint a-arborescences inG
can be solved in timeO(m2 k2), see Gabow [10, Theorem 3.1]. Introducingur
copies for each edger ∈ R, the problem of finding admissible strategies in the
original problem is equivalent to findingn disjoint a-arborescences.
Proof of Theorem 8 (contd.) Suppose that the underlying SP instance
is a Yes-instance, then anα-improving move is as follows. The master player
moves tort, the k set players corresponding to a solution choose their set re-
sources, the respective inclusion players move to the element resources, and all
element players move tora. The delay ofrc reduces fromα + 1 to 1, and the
delay ofrt reduces fromα + 1 to 1. Thus, the master player, all set players, and
all element players improve their bottleneck by a factor ofα + 1. The migrat-
ing inclusion players do not interfere with each other on theelement resources.
Thus, they also improve the delay of their bottleneck resource by factorα + 1,
and we have constructed anα-improving move for the coalition of all migrating
players, all set players, and all element players.
Suppose that the underlying S P instance is a No-instance. For con-
tradiction, assume that there is a coalitionC that has anα-improving move.
Consider any playerp ∈ C. We will show that for any playerp , p1, i.e., any
set, inclusion, or element player,p1 ∈ C is a prerequisite for achieving any strict
improvement. We first note that the master player can never strictly improve
without changing his strategy, because all element playerswill always userc in
their strategy. A move fromrc to rt is an improvement if and only if at leastk
set players droprt. These players must switch to the corresponding resources.
However, for a set playerpM such a move is an improvement if and only if all
inclusion players onrU drop this resource from their strategy. These inclusion
players must switch to the element resources. An inclusion player pU,e improves
by such a move if and only if the element player drops the resource andpU,e is
the only inclusion player moving tore. This implies that the moving set players
must correspond to sets that are mutually disjoint. Finally, the element players
move fromre to ra with delaydra = 0, and this is an improvement if and only if
the master player moves away fromrc. This last argument establishes thatp ∈ C
implies p1 ∈ C.
However, if the master playerp1 ∈ C, then we again follow the chain of
reasoning above and see that the players corresponding to atleastk mutually
disjoint sets must move and therefore be inC. This is a contradiction to having
a No-instance.
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Finally, we can add the resourcera to every strategy of the master, set, and
inclusion players. In this way, the combinatorial structure of all strategy spaces
is the same – a partition matroidM with rk(M) = 2 and partitions of size 1 and
2 – only the mapping to resources is different for each player.
Proof of Corollary 1 We will show this corollary using the games constructed
in the previous proof by fixing the coalitionC = N. Consider the construction in
the previous proof. The coalition described above that has an improving move
for a Yes-instance consists of the master player, all set players, all element play-
ers and the inclusion players that correspond to the sets of the solution to S
P. However, the inclusion players are only needed to transferth chain
of dependencies to the element players. We can set the strategy space of player
pU,e to {rh, r l} × {rU , re}. Hererh andr l are two resources with delaysdrh = α+1
anddr l = 0. In S we assign the inclusion players to strategies{rh, rU }. Then an
improving move for the inclusion players that remain onrU is to exchangerh by
r l . Thus, the problem of finding an arbitrary coalition with an improving move
becomes trivial. However, we strive to obtain an improving move forC = N,
and this must generate improvements for the master player and the set players.
Thus, we still must reassign some inclusion players from theresourcesrU to
the element resourcesre. Here we need to resolve conflicts as before, because
otherwise inclusion players end up with a delay ofα + 1 on re and do not im-
prove. Following the previous reasoning we have anα-improving move if and
only if the underlying S P instance is solvable. Finally, by appropriately
adding dummy resources, we can again ensure that the combinatorial structure
of all strategy spaces is the same.
Proof of Theorem 9 We transform the construction of Theorem 8 into a sym-
metric network bottleneck congestion game, see Fig. 1 for anexample. First,
we introduce for each resourcerc, rt, rU for all U ∈ U andre for all e ∈ E an
edge with the corresponding delay function as before. Additionally, we identify
players and their strategies by routing them through a set ofgadgets composed
of edges, which have capacities implemented by cost functios that are 1 up to
a capacity bound andα + 10 above.
The first gadget is to separate the players into groups. An edge with capacity
1 identifies the master player, an edge with capacity|U| the set players, an edge
with capacity
∑
U∈U |U | the inclusion players, and an edge with capacity|E| the
element players. The set and inclusion players are then further divided into their
particular identities by edges of capacity 1. The element players route all over
rc. In addition, the master player has the alternative to routever rc or rt. After
the players have passedrc they again split into specific element players using
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edges of capacity 1. One player is allowed to route directly to the sourcet. This
is meant to be the master player, but it does not hurt our argument if this is not
the case.
After the players have routed through the capacitated gadgets, they can be
assumed to reach an identification point (indicated by gray nodes in Fig. 1)
and obtain an identity. Then they decide on a strategy from the previous game
by routing over one of two allowed paths. In particular, we can allow the set
players to route either overrt or theirrU , the inclusion players overrU or re, and
the element players overre or directly to the sinkt.
We can create the corresponding stateS as before by assigning the master
player to route overc directly to the sink, the set players overrt, the inclusion
players overrU and the element players overre. This assignment is such that
every player receives one identity (i.e., routes over exactly one gray node) and
every identity is taken (i.e., every gray node is reached by exactly one player).
This property also holds for every improving move – with the exception of one
element player, who might route directly fromrc to the sink, but as noted before
this does not hurt the argument.
Our network structure allows to reconstruct the reasoning as before. Any
improving move must include the master player, which improves if and only
if he moves together with players corresponding to a solution to the Set Pack-
ing instance. Note that even by switching player identities, we cannot create an
improving move when the underlying Set Packing instance is unsolvable. This
proves the first part of the theorem.
For the second part, we use the same adjustment as in Corollary 1 to en-
sure that inclusion players can always improve. Directly before the middle fan
out (see Figure 1) that results in identification of inclusion players we simply
insert a small gadget with 2 parallel edgesr l and rh. In this way, all inclusion
players must route over one ofr l or rh and one of their correspondingrU or re.
This resembles the strategy choices in the matroid game and yields hardness of











Fig. 1.Network construction for a S P instance withU = {{e1,e2}, {e2,e3}, {e3,e1}}. Gray
nodes serve as identification for players as discussed in thetext.
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Description of G(n) In this section, we recapitulate the construction ofG(n)
from [22]. This shows that (bottleneck) congestion games donot converge quickly
to a PNE even if the players only performα-greedy steps.
We construct a (bottleneck) congestion gameG(n) that resembles a recur-
sive run ofn programs, i.e., sequences ofα-greedy steps. After its activation,
programi triggers a run of programi − 1, waits until it finishes its run, and trig-
gers it a second time. These sequences are deterministic apart from the order in
which some auxiliary players make their improvement steps.
Strategies of Blockji ResourcesDelays






Fig. 2. Definition of the strategies of the players Blockji
A program i is implemented by a gadgetGi consisting of a main player
that we call Maini and eight auxiliary players called Block
1
i , . . . ,Block
8
i . The
main player has nine strategies numbered from 1 to 9. Each auxiliary player
has two strategies, a first and a second one. A gadgetGi is idle if all of its
players play their first strategy. GadgetGi+1 activatesgadgetGi by increasing
the delay of (the bottleneck resource in) the first strategy of player Maini . In the
following sequence of improvement steps the player Maini successively changes
to the strategies 2, . . . , 8. We call this sequence arun of Gi. During each run,
Maini activates gadgetGi−1 twice by increasing the delay of the (bottleneck
resource in the) first strategy of Maini−1. GadgetGi+1 is blocked (by player
Block8i ) until player Maini reaches its strategy 9. ThenGi+1 continues its run,
that is, it decreases the delay of the bottleneck resource inthe first strategy of
player Maini, waits until gadgetGi becomes idle again, and afterwards triggers a
second run ofGi. The role of the auxiliary players ofGi is to control the strategy
changes of Maini and Maini+1.
In the initial states, every gadgetGi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 is idle. GadgetGn is
activated. In every improvement path starting froms, gadgetGi is activated 2n−i
times, which yields the theorem.
Now we go into the details of our construction. The (bottleneck) congestion
gameG(n) consists of the gadgetsG1, . . . ,Gn. Each gadgetGi consists of a
player Maini and the players Block
1
i , . . . ,Block
8
i . The nine strategies of a player
Maini are given in Figure 3. The two strategies of a player Block
j
i are given in
Figure 2.δ = 10α9 is a scaling factor for the delay functions.
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The auxiliary players implement a locking mechanism. The first strategy of




i } and its second strategy is{c
j
i }. The delays of the re-
sourcesb ji andc
j
i are relatively small (δ
i−1 and 2αδi−1, respectively) if allocated
by only one player. If they are allocated by two or more players, however, then
each of them induce a significantly larger delay ofδi+2. Theses resources are also
part of the strategies of Maini or Maini+1. Note, that neither Maini nor Maini+1
has an incentive to change to a strategy having a delay ofδi+2 or more. The
delay of the resourcet ji is chosen such that Block
j
i has an incentive to change
to its second strategy if Maini allocates this resource. If Maini either allocates
this resource nor the resourceb ji , it has an incentive to change to its first strat-
egy. Due to scaling factorδi−1 the delays of the resourcet ji do not affect the
preferences of Maini .
These definitions yield the following properties. If auxiliary player Blockji
of gadgetGi plays its first strategy then this prevents Maini from choosing strat-
egy j + 2. Player Blockji has an incentive to change to its second strategy only
if player Maini chooses its strategyj + 1. By this mechanism, we ensure that
Maini chooses the strategies 1 to 8 in the right order. In addition,he first strat-
egy of Block8i prevents Maini+1 from going to strategy 4 or 8. This ensures that
Maini+1 waits until the run of player Maini is completed. Furthermore, Maini+1
can enter into strategy 3 or 7 only if all auxiliary players ofgadgetGi use their
first strategy. This ensures that a run starts with all auxiliary players being in
their first strategy.
This shows that in every sequence of improvement steps froms to a Nash
equilibrium in the (bottleneck) congestion gameG(n) each gadgeti is activated
2n−i times. One can easily check that every improvement step of a player de-
creases its delay (of the bottleneck resource) by a factor ofat leastα and ev-



































































Fig. 3. Definition of the strategies of the players Maini . The delay of resource1n is constantly
9α9δn.
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Proof of Theorem 10 Our proof adjusts the construction of [22], which we
recapitulated above. The main idea of our adjustment is to construct a bottle-
neck congestion gameG(n, k) by generatingk copies of the gameG(n). We then
add resources to the strategies. These resources make sure that there is a im-
provement step for a player inG(n) if and only if there is a improvement step of
correspondingk players of thek copies inG(n, k).
To each strategyj ∈ {1, . . . , 9} of player every Maini of every the copy
m ∈ {1, . . . , k} we add a resourceA ji,k. Additionally, we add this resource to
all strategiesj′ , j of all players Maini of every other copym′ , m. Each of
these resources has delay ofδi−1 if it is allocated by at most one player and
δi+3 otherwise. Analogously, we add resources to the strategiesof the auxiliary
players. That is, for every player Blockji of every copym ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we add a
resourceB ji in his strategy 1. We also add his resource in every strategy 2of the
every player Blockji of every other copiesm
′
, m. Similarly, for every player
Blockji of every copym ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we add a resourceC
j
i in his strategy 2,
which we also add to every strategy 1 of the every player Blockji f every other
copiesm′ , m. Each of these resources has a delay ofδi−1 if it is allocated by at
most one player andδi+3 otherwise. Finally, we have to increaseδ slightly.
We obtain the initial strategy profiles′ of G(n, k) if every player of every
copym of G(n) plays according to the initial strategy profileS of his copy. It it
easy to see, that no coalition of less thank player of a copym has an incentive
to change their strategies. At least one of them would have toallocate aA-,
B-, or C-resource that is already in use by another player. Thus, it inot an
improvement step for these players. We, therefore, can conclude that allk copies
of a player always choose the same strategy. On the other hand, if there is an
improving move of one player inG(n), there is a coalitional improving move of
all k copies of that player inG(n, k). If all players mimic this deviation in their
copies, by construction, no two players allocate the sameA-, B-, or C-resource.
Furthermore, if the improvement step decreases the delay inG(n), it does so for
every copy of the player inG(n, k).
Finally, note that as long ask is polynomial inn we obtain a reduction of
polynomial size. In particular, fork = n1/ǫ−1 we obtain a new game withnk
players, for which the unilateral moves ofG(n) are exactly moves of coalitions
of size (nk)1−ǫ and no smaller coalitions have improving moves. This provesth
theorem.
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